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crabwalk β€” live demo

Windows EVTX lateral-movement hunter: stateful cross-host correlation, an attack-path graph, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping. Generated by crabwalk 0.1.0 from the bundled demo logs.

← Project page (in Turkish)

9
EVTX files
129
Records
13
Findings
3
Attack-path edges
8
ATT&CK techniques
Critical 4High 6Medium 3

What happened

These nine demo files are separate public lab recordings, not one intrusion. crabwalk joins them where host names and addresses repeat, which is why it flags the weeks-long gaps below.

1 attack path across 4 hosts, and findings on 2 more hosts, 2019-01-19 to 2020-09-27. 13 findings: 4 critical, 6 high, 3 medium.

Path 1: NLLT108334 β†’ PC01.example.corp β†’ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp (also: IEWIN7)

4 hosts Β· 2019-01-19 to 2019-04-30 Β· started from NLLT108334 Β· worst finding: critical

Caution: this path has gaps of 28 days, 29 days and 42 days. crabwalk links these hosts only because they share host names and addresses; it has no case or incident ID, so confirm that the steps belong to one intrusion before reporting them as one.

  1. 2019-01-19 13:00:10ZCRITICALNLLT108334 (10.0.2.16) β†’ IEWIN7 as IEWIN7\IEUser: copied 'blabla.exe' to ADMIN$, then ran it through PsExec with its service renamed to 'blabla' CW-012T1021.002T1569.002T1570
  2. 2019-02-16 17:54:41Z
    –17:57:55Z
    CRITICAL(28 days later) 10.0.2.16 (named NLLT108334 elsewhere in the logs) β†’ PC01.example.corp as PC01\IEUser: copied 'System32\RemComSvc.exe' to ADMIN$, then used the service control manager remotely (svcctl) CW-012T1021.002T1569.002T1570
  3. 2019-02-16 18:19:18ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as PC01\IEUser: accessed executable 'Windows\System32\RemComSvc.exe' on C$ CW-005T1021.002T1570
  4. 2019-03-18 11:06:25ZHIGH(29 days later) on PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
  5. 2019-03-18 11:06:29ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: started a process with injected credentials (logon type 9 via seclogo: the sekurlsa::pth pattern) CW-003T1550.002
  6. 2019-03-18 11:27:00ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
  7. 2019-03-18 11:27:23ZlogonPC01.example.corp β†’ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: used explicit credentials (4648) 3 times
  8. 2019-03-18 22:15:49ZlogonPC01.example.corp (10.0.2.17) β†’ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator and EXAMPLE\user01: 4 network logons
  9. 2019-03-19 00:02:00ZHIGHon WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
  10. 2019-03-19 00:02:04ZHIGH10.0.2.17 (named PC01.example.corp elsewhere in the logs) β†’ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: an anonymous null session, then logged on over NTLM with admin rights twice (possible pass-the-hash), then created scheduled task '\CYAlyNSS' to run 'cmd.exe' through the task scheduler (atsvc) CW-003, CW-012T1021.002T1053.005T1550.002
  11. 2019-03-19 00:02:04ZMEDIUMon WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: logged on over NTLM with admin rights (possible pass-the-hash) CW-003T1550.002
  12. 2019-04-30 20:26:51ZCRITICAL(42 days later) on IEWIN7, from a host the logs do not name: set service 'hello' to run %%COMSPEC%% /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni… (+2355 chars) through the service control manager (ntsvcs) CW-012T1021.002T1543.003T1569.002

Findings on hosts not on a path

No reconstructed step leads to these hosts; each line says what its records show about where the activity came from.

  1. 2019-05-08 02:10:43ZCRITICALon DC1.insecurebank.local as insecurebank\Administrator: requested directory replication from a non-DC account (DCSync) CW-011T1003.006
  1. 2020-09-27 13:42:01ZMEDIUMon MSEDGEWIN10: ran PsExec against this same host (client psexec.exe, service renamed to 'svchost'); no other host involved CW-012T1569.002

Generated from the findings and the attack graph, not written by hand. The same story in Markdown, as crabwalk hunt --story writes it for a ticket or case file: story.md.

Report

The self-contained HTML report: the story, attack paths, severity, ATT&CK coverage, timeline and every finding.

Attack paths

The interactive graph: hover or click a host to follow where the attacker came from and went next.

ATT&CK Navigator

The techniques behind these findings as a heatmap on the ATT&CK matrix, opened straight from this site.

findings.json

The raw findings and the story: the findings and story keys of crabwalk hunt --out.

About this data

Nine unmodified recordings from the public EVTX-ATTACK-SAMPLES corpus (GPL-3.0), bundled in the repository's demo folder. They are separate lab captures, not one intrusion β€” what each file shows. Rebuilt on every push to the repository; run it yourself with crabwalk hunt demo/evtx --report report.html.