# What happened

1 attack path across 4 hosts, and findings on 2 more hosts, 2019-01-19 to 2020-09-27. 13 findings: 4 critical, 6 high, 3 medium.

## Path 1: NLLT108334 → PC01.example.corp → WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp (also: IEWIN7)

*4 hosts · 2019-01-19 to 2019-04-30 · started from NLLT108334 · worst finding: critical*

> **Caution:** this path has gaps of 28 days, 29 days and 42 days. crabwalk links these hosts only because they share host names and addresses; it has no case or incident ID, so confirm that the steps belong to one intrusion before reporting them as one.

- **2019-01-19 13:00:10Z** NLLT108334 (10.0.2.16) → IEWIN7 as IEWIN7\\IEUser: copied 'blabla.exe' to ADMIN$, then ran it through PsExec with its service renamed to 'blabla' *(critical · CW-012 · T1021.002, T1569.002, T1570)*
- **2019-02-16 17:54:41Z–17:57:55Z** (28 days later) 10.0.2.16 (named NLLT108334 elsewhere in the logs) → PC01.example.corp as PC01\\IEUser: copied 'System32\\RemComSvc.exe' to ADMIN$, then used the service control manager remotely (svcctl) *(critical · CW-012 · T1021.002, T1569.002, T1570)*
- **2019-02-16 18:19:18Z** on PC01.example.corp as PC01\\IEUser: accessed executable 'Windows\\System32\\RemComSvc.exe' on C$ *(high · CW-005 · T1021.002, T1570)*
- **2019-03-18 11:06:25Z** (29 days later) on PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\\user01: cleared the Security log *(high · CW-009 · T1070.001)*
- **2019-03-18 11:06:29Z** on PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\\user01: started a process with injected credentials (logon type 9 via seclogo: the sekurlsa::pth pattern) *(high · CW-003 · T1550.002)*
- **2019-03-18 11:27:00Z** on PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\\user01: cleared the Security log *(high · CW-009 · T1070.001)*
- **2019-03-18 11:27:23Z** PC01.example.corp → WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\\Administrator: used explicit credentials (4648) 3 times
- **2019-03-18 22:15:49Z** PC01.example.corp (10.0.2.17) → WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\\Administrator and EXAMPLE\\user01: 4 network logons
- **2019-03-19 00:02:00Z** on WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\\Administrator: cleared the Security log *(high · CW-009 · T1070.001)*
- **2019-03-19 00:02:04Z** 10.0.2.17 (named PC01.example.corp elsewhere in the logs) → WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\\Administrator: an anonymous null session, then logged on over NTLM with admin rights twice (possible pass-the-hash), then created scheduled task '\\CYAlyNSS' to run 'cmd.exe' through the task scheduler (atsvc) *(high · CW-003, CW-012 · T1021.002, T1053.005, T1550.002)*
- **2019-03-19 00:02:04Z** on WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\\Administrator: logged on over NTLM with admin rights (possible pass-the-hash) *(medium · CW-003 · T1550.002)*
- **2019-04-30 20:26:51Z** (42 days later) on IEWIN7, from a host the logs do not name: set service 'hello' to run %%COMSPEC%% /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni… (+2355 chars) through the service control manager (ntsvcs) *(critical · CW-012 · T1021.002, T1543.003, T1569.002)*

## Findings on hosts not on a path

*No reconstructed step leads to these hosts; each line says what its records show about where the activity came from.*

- **2019-05-08 02:10:43Z** on DC1.insecurebank.local as insecurebank\\Administrator: requested directory replication from a non-DC account (DCSync) *(critical · CW-011 · T1003.006)*
- **2020-09-27 13:42:01Z** on MSEDGEWIN10: ran PsExec against this same host (client psexec.exe, service renamed to 'svchost'); no other host involved *(medium · CW-012 · T1569.002)*
