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crabwalk β€” demo report

Generated 2026-10-19 08:54:04Z · crabwalk EVTX lateral movement hunter

9
Files
123
Events kept
13
Sessions
9
Remote sessions
12
Movement edges
13
Findings

Severity

Critical 4High 6Medium 3

What happened

1 attack path across 4 hosts, and findings on 2 more hosts, 2019-01-19 to 2020-09-27. 13 findings: 4 critical, 6 high, 3 medium.

Path 1: NLLT108334 β†’ PC01.example.corp β†’ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp (also: IEWIN7)

4 hosts Β· 2019-01-19 to 2019-04-30 Β· started from NLLT108334 Β· worst finding: critical

Caution: this path has gaps of 28 days, 29 days and 42 days. crabwalk links these hosts only because they share host names and addresses; it has no case or incident ID, so confirm that the steps belong to one intrusion before reporting them as one.

  1. 2019-01-19 13:00:10ZCRITICALNLLT108334 (10.0.2.16) β†’ IEWIN7 as IEWIN7\IEUser: copied 'blabla.exe' to ADMIN$, then ran it through PsExec with its service renamed to 'blabla' CW-012T1021.002T1569.002T1570
  2. 2019-02-16 17:54:41Z
    –17:57:55Z
    CRITICAL(28 days later) 10.0.2.16 (named NLLT108334 elsewhere in the logs) β†’ PC01.example.corp as PC01\IEUser: copied 'System32\RemComSvc.exe' to ADMIN$, then used the service control manager remotely (svcctl) CW-012T1021.002T1569.002T1570
  3. 2019-02-16 18:19:18ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as PC01\IEUser: accessed executable 'Windows\System32\RemComSvc.exe' on C$ CW-005T1021.002T1570
  4. 2019-03-18 11:06:25ZHIGH(29 days later) on PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
  5. 2019-03-18 11:06:29ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: started a process with injected credentials (logon type 9 via seclogo: the sekurlsa::pth pattern) CW-003T1550.002
  6. 2019-03-18 11:27:00ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
  7. 2019-03-18 11:27:23ZlogonPC01.example.corp β†’ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: used explicit credentials (4648) 3 times
  8. 2019-03-18 22:15:49ZlogonPC01.example.corp (10.0.2.17) β†’ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator and EXAMPLE\user01: 4 network logons
  9. 2019-03-19 00:02:00ZHIGHon WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
  10. 2019-03-19 00:02:04ZHIGH10.0.2.17 (named PC01.example.corp elsewhere in the logs) β†’ WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: an anonymous null session, then logged on over NTLM with admin rights twice (possible pass-the-hash), then created scheduled task '\CYAlyNSS' to run 'cmd.exe' through the task scheduler (atsvc) CW-003, CW-012T1021.002T1053.005T1550.002
  11. 2019-03-19 00:02:04ZMEDIUMon WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: logged on over NTLM with admin rights (possible pass-the-hash) CW-003T1550.002
  12. 2019-04-30 20:26:51ZCRITICAL(42 days later) on IEWIN7, from a host the logs do not name: set service 'hello' to run %%COMSPEC%% /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni… (+2355 chars) through the service control manager (ntsvcs) CW-012T1021.002T1543.003T1569.002

Findings on hosts not on a path

No reconstructed step leads to these hosts; each line says what its records show about where the activity came from.

  1. 2019-05-08 02:10:43ZCRITICALon DC1.insecurebank.local as insecurebank\Administrator: requested directory replication from a non-DC account (DCSync) CW-011T1003.006
  1. 2020-09-27 13:42:01ZMEDIUMon MSEDGEWIN10: ran PsExec against this same host (client psexec.exe, service renamed to 'svchost'); no other host involved CW-012T1569.002

Attack paths (4 hosts · 3 edges · 1 origin(s) · 2 more host(s) with findings but no observed movement)

nllt108334 -> iewin7 2019-01-19 13:00:10Z CW-012 IEWIN7\IEUser [critical] Remote execution over named pipesnllt108334 -> pc01 2019-02-16 17:54:41Z CW-012 PC01\IEUser [critical] Remote execution over named pipespc01 -> win-77ltaphiq1r 2019-03-18 11:27:23Z explicit creds EXAMPLE.CORP\administrator 2019-03-18 11:27:23Z explicit creds EXAMPLE.CORP\administrator 2019-03-18 11:27:23Z explicit creds example\administrator 2019-03-18 22:15:49Z logon EXAMPLE\Administrator 2019-03-18 22:15:49Z logon EXAMPLE\Administrator 2019-03-18 22:15:49Z logon EXAMPLE\Administrator 2019-03-18 22:15:49Z logon EXAMPLE\user01 2019-03-19 00:02:04Z logon NT AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON 2019-03-19 00:02:04Z CW-003 EXAMPLE\Administrator [medium] Pass-the-hash indicators 2019-03-19 00:02:04Z logon EXAMPLE\Administrator (privileged) 2019-03-19 00:02:04Z logon EXAMPLE\Administrator (privileged) 2019-03-19 00:02:04Z CW-012 EXAMPLE\Administrator [high] Remote execution over named pipesCW-012CW-012logon +3 Γ—12 Β· adminNLLT108334 10.0.2.16 origin: sends movement, receives noneNLLT10833410.0.2.16 Β· originIEWIN7 CW-012 Γ—2IEWIN72PC01.example.corp 10.0.2.17 CW-003 Γ—1 CW-005 Γ—1 CW-009 Γ—2 CW-012 Γ—1PC01.example.corp10.0.2.175WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp CW-003 Γ—2 CW-009 Γ—1 CW-012 Γ—1WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.…4
Logon / session movementCritical findingHigh findingMedium findingLow findingHost border = worst finding on it; badge = finding count

ATT&CK coverage (8 techniques)

TechniqueNameFindingsRules
T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares5CW-005, CW-012
T1569.002System Services: Service Execution4CW-012
T1070.001Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs3CW-009
T1550.002Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Hash3CW-003
T1570Lateral Tool Transfer3CW-005, CW-012
T1003.006OS Credential Dumping: DCSync1CW-011
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task1CW-012
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service1CW-012

Timeline

DC1.insecurebank.localIEWIN7MSEDGEWIN10PC01.example.corpWIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp2019-01-192019-05-022019-08-132019-11-242020-03-052020-06-162020-09-272019-03-19 00:02:04Z CW-003 Pass-the-hash indicators (medium)2019-03-19 00:02:04Z CW-003 Pass-the-hash indicators (medium)2020-09-27 13:42:01Z CW-012 Local execution through a remote-exec tool's pipes (medium)2019-02-16 18:19:18Z CW-005 Executable on administrative share (high)2019-03-18 11:06:25Z CW-009 Event log cleared (high)2019-03-18 11:06:29Z CW-003 Pass-the-hash indicators (high)2019-03-18 11:27:00Z CW-009 Event log cleared (high)2019-03-19 00:02:00Z CW-009 Event log cleared (high)2019-03-19 00:02:04Z CW-012 Remote execution over named pipes (high)2019-01-19 13:00:10Z CW-012 Remote execution over named pipes (critical)2019-02-16 17:54:41Z CW-012 Remote execution over named pipes (critical)2019-04-30 20:26:51Z CW-012 Remote execution over named pipes (critical)2019-05-08 02:10:43Z CW-011 DCSync (directory replication) (critical)
CriticalHighMediumLow

Host-to-host movement (10 edges)

TimeUserSourceDestinationKind
2019-03-18 11:27:23ZEXAMPLE.CORP\administratorPC01.example.corpWIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpexplicit-credentials
2019-03-18 11:27:23ZEXAMPLE.CORP\administratorPC01.example.corpWIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpexplicit-credentials
2019-03-18 11:27:23Zexample\administratorPC01.example.corpWIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpexplicit-credentials
2019-03-18 22:15:49ZEXAMPLE\Administrator10.0.2.17WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpnetwork
2019-03-18 22:15:49ZEXAMPLE\Administrator10.0.2.17WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpnetwork
2019-03-18 22:15:49ZEXAMPLE\Administrator10.0.2.17 (PC01)WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpnetwork
2019-03-18 22:15:49ZEXAMPLE\user0110.0.2.17WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpnetwork
2019-03-19 00:02:04ZNT AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON10.0.2.17 (NULL)WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpnetwork
2019-03-19 00:02:04ZEXAMPLE\Administrator10.0.2.17WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpnetwork priv
2019-03-19 00:02:04ZEXAMPLE\Administrator10.0.2.17WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corpnetwork priv

Findings (13)

CRITICAL CW-012 Remote execution over named pipes 2019-01-19 13:00:10Z
host IEWIN7   user IEWIN7\IEUser   T1021.002 T1569.002 T1570
PsExec-style stdio pipes: \blabla-NLLT108334-37048-stderr, \blabla-NLLT108334-37048-stdin, \blabla-NLLT108334-37048-stdout, \svcctl; from 10.0.2.16; service 'blabla' (renamed) launched from host NLLT108334 (pid 37048); after 'blabla.exe' was written to \\*\ADMIN$
also matched CW-005 Executable on administrative share (high) 13:00:10Z user IEWIN7\IEUser: 'blabla.exe' accessed on \\*\ADMIN$ from 10.0.2.16
CRITICAL CW-012 Remote execution over named pipes 2019-02-16 17:54:41Z
host PC01.example.corp   user PC01\IEUser   T1021.002 T1569.002 T1570
remote service-control pipe access: \svcctl; from 10.0.2.16; after 'System32\RemComSvc.exe' was written to \\*\ADMIN$
also matched CW-005 Executable on administrative share (high) 17:54:26Z user PC01\IEUser: 'System32\RemComSvc.exe' accessed on \\*\ADMIN$ from 10.0.2.16
CRITICAL CW-012 Remote execution over named pipes 2019-04-30 20:26:51Z
host IEWIN7   user -   T1021.002 T1569.002 T1543.003
remote service-control pipe access: \ntsvcs; then ImagePath of service 'hello' set to %%COMSPEC%% /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -c "if([IntP
CRITICAL CW-011 DCSync (directory replication) 2019-05-08 02:10:43Z
host DC1.insecurebank.local   user insecurebank\Administrator   T1003.006
Directory replication (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) requested by non-DC principal insecurebank\Administrator
HIGH CW-005 Executable on administrative share 2019-02-16 18:19:18Z
host PC01.example.corp   user PC01\IEUser   T1021.002 T1570
'Windows\System32\RemComSvc.exe' accessed on \\*\C$ from ::1
HIGH CW-009 Event log cleared 2019-03-18 11:06:25Z
host PC01.example.corp   user EXAMPLE\user01   T1070.001
Security audit log cleared (1102)
HIGH CW-003 Pass-the-hash indicators 2019-03-18 11:06:29Z
host PC01.example.corp   user EXAMPLE\user01   T1550.002
Logon type 9 via seclogo with outbound credentials '?' (sekurlsa::pth signature)
HIGH CW-009 Event log cleared 2019-03-18 11:27:00Z
host PC01.example.corp   user EXAMPLE\user01   T1070.001
Security audit log cleared (1102)
HIGH CW-009 Event log cleared 2019-03-19 00:02:00Z
host WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp   user EXAMPLE\administrator   T1070.001
Security audit log cleared (1102)
HIGH CW-012 Remote execution over named pipes 2019-03-19 00:02:04Z
host WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp   user EXAMPLE\Administrator   T1021.002 T1053.005
remote task-scheduler pipe access: \atsvc; from 10.0.2.17; then task '\CYAlyNSS' created
MEDIUM CW-003 Pass-the-hash indicators 2019-03-19 00:02:04Z
host WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp   user EXAMPLE\Administrator   T1550.002
2 privileged NTLM network logons from 10.0.2.17 within a second (workstation: ?)
MEDIUM CW-003 Pass-the-hash indicators 2019-03-19 00:02:04Z
host WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp   user EXAMPLE\Administrator   T1550.002
Privileged NTLM network logon from - (workstation: ?)
MEDIUM CW-012 Local execution through a remote-exec tool's pipes 2020-09-27 13:42:01Z
host MSEDGEWIN10   user -   T1569.002
local use, client ran on this host by psexec.exe: PsExec-style stdio pipes: \svchost-MSEDGEWIN10-8116-stderr, \svchost-MSEDGEWIN10-8116-stdin, \svchost-MSEDGEWIN10-8116-stdout; service 'svchost' (renamed) launched from host MSEDGEWIN10 (pid 8116)