What happened
1 attack path across 4 hosts, and findings on 2 more hosts, 2019-01-19 to 2020-09-27. 13 findings: 4 critical, 6 high, 3 medium.
Path 1: NLLT108334 β PC01.example.corp β WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp (also: IEWIN7)
4 hosts Β· 2019-01-19 to 2019-04-30 Β· started from NLLT108334 Β· worst finding: critical
Caution: this path has gaps of 28 days, 29 days and 42 days. crabwalk links these hosts only because they share host names and addresses; it has no case or incident ID, so confirm that the steps belong to one intrusion before reporting them as one.
- 2019-01-19 13:00:10ZCRITICALNLLT108334 (10.0.2.16) β IEWIN7 as IEWIN7\IEUser: copied 'blabla.exe' to ADMIN$, then ran it through PsExec with its service renamed to 'blabla' CW-012T1021.002T1569.002T1570
- 2019-02-16 17:54:41Z
β17:57:55ZCRITICAL(28 days later) 10.0.2.16 (named NLLT108334 elsewhere in the logs) β PC01.example.corp as PC01\IEUser: copied 'System32\RemComSvc.exe' to ADMIN$, then used the service control manager remotely (svcctl) CW-012T1021.002T1569.002T1570 - 2019-02-16 18:19:18ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as PC01\IEUser: accessed executable 'Windows\System32\RemComSvc.exe' on C$ CW-005T1021.002T1570
- 2019-03-18 11:06:25ZHIGH(29 days later) on PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
- 2019-03-18 11:06:29ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: started a process with injected credentials (logon type 9 via seclogo: the sekurlsa::pth pattern) CW-003T1550.002
- 2019-03-18 11:27:00ZHIGHon PC01.example.corp as EXAMPLE\user01: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
- 2019-03-18 11:27:23ZlogonPC01.example.corp β WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: used explicit credentials (4648) 3 times
- 2019-03-18 22:15:49ZlogonPC01.example.corp (10.0.2.17) β WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator and EXAMPLE\user01: 4 network logons
- 2019-03-19 00:02:00ZHIGHon WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: cleared the Security log CW-009T1070.001
- 2019-03-19 00:02:04ZHIGH10.0.2.17 (named PC01.example.corp elsewhere in the logs) β WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: an anonymous null session, then logged on over NTLM with admin rights twice (possible pass-the-hash), then created scheduled task '\CYAlyNSS' to run 'cmd.exe' through the task scheduler (atsvc) CW-003, CW-012T1021.002T1053.005T1550.002
- 2019-03-19 00:02:04ZMEDIUMon WIN-77LTAPHIQ1R.example.corp as EXAMPLE\Administrator: logged on over NTLM with admin rights (possible pass-the-hash) CW-003T1550.002
- 2019-04-30 20:26:51ZCRITICAL(42 days later) on IEWIN7, from a host the logs do not name: set service 'hello' to run %%COMSPEC%% /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni⦠(+2355 chars) through the service control manager (ntsvcs) CW-012T1021.002T1543.003T1569.002
Findings on hosts not on a path
No reconstructed step leads to these hosts; each line says what its records show about where the activity came from.
- 2019-05-08 02:10:43ZCRITICALon DC1.insecurebank.local as insecurebank\Administrator: requested directory replication from a non-DC account (DCSync) CW-011T1003.006
- 2020-09-27 13:42:01ZMEDIUMon MSEDGEWIN10: ran PsExec against this same host (client psexec.exe, service renamed to 'svchost'); no other host involved CW-012T1569.002
Findings (13)
CRITICAL
CW-012
Remote execution over named pipes
2019-01-19 13:00:10Z
PsExec-style stdio pipes: \blabla-NLLT108334-37048-stderr, \blabla-NLLT108334-37048-stdin, \blabla-NLLT108334-37048-stdout, \svcctl; from 10.0.2.16; service 'blabla' (renamed) launched from host NLLT108334 (pid 37048); after 'blabla.exe' was written to \\*\ADMIN$
also matched CW-005 Executable on administrative share (high) 13:00:10Z user IEWIN7\IEUser: 'blabla.exe' accessed on \\*\ADMIN$ from 10.0.2.16
CRITICAL
CW-012
Remote execution over named pipes
2019-02-16 17:54:41Z
remote service-control pipe access: \svcctl; from 10.0.2.16; after 'System32\RemComSvc.exe' was written to \\*\ADMIN$
also matched CW-005 Executable on administrative share (high) 17:54:26Z user PC01\IEUser: 'System32\RemComSvc.exe' accessed on \\*\ADMIN$ from 10.0.2.16
CRITICAL
CW-012
Remote execution over named pipes
2019-04-30 20:26:51Z
remote service-control pipe access: \ntsvcs; then ImagePath of service 'hello' set to %%COMSPEC%% /b /c start /b /min powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -noni -c "if([IntP
CRITICAL
CW-011
DCSync (directory replication)
2019-05-08 02:10:43Z
Directory replication (DS-Replication-Get-Changes) requested by non-DC principal insecurebank\Administrator
HIGH
CW-005
Executable on administrative share
2019-02-16 18:19:18Z
'Windows\System32\RemComSvc.exe' accessed on \\*\C$ from ::1
HIGH
CW-009
Event log cleared
2019-03-18 11:06:25Z
Security audit log cleared (1102)
HIGH
CW-003
Pass-the-hash indicators
2019-03-18 11:06:29Z
Logon type 9 via seclogo with outbound credentials '?' (sekurlsa::pth signature)
HIGH
CW-009
Event log cleared
2019-03-18 11:27:00Z
Security audit log cleared (1102)
HIGH
CW-009
Event log cleared
2019-03-19 00:02:00Z
Security audit log cleared (1102)
HIGH
CW-012
Remote execution over named pipes
2019-03-19 00:02:04Z
remote task-scheduler pipe access: \atsvc; from 10.0.2.17; then task '\CYAlyNSS' created
MEDIUM
CW-003
Pass-the-hash indicators
2019-03-19 00:02:04Z
2 privileged NTLM network logons from 10.0.2.17 within a second (workstation: ?)
MEDIUM
CW-003
Pass-the-hash indicators
2019-03-19 00:02:04Z
Privileged NTLM network logon from - (workstation: ?)
MEDIUM
CW-012
Local execution through a remote-exec tool's pipes
2020-09-27 13:42:01Z
local use, client ran on this host by psexec.exe: PsExec-style stdio pipes: \svchost-MSEDGEWIN10-8116-stderr, \svchost-MSEDGEWIN10-8116-stdin, \svchost-MSEDGEWIN10-8116-stdout; service 'svchost' (renamed) launched from host MSEDGEWIN10 (pid 8116)